A LIFE CHANGING YEAR

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Fellows' accounts of what they have been doing during their year at Wiko reflect the disparate nature of the Fellowship and of Fellows' experiences. In this report, my wife Caroline (who spent the year at Wiko as a fully-integrated "partner") and I seek to capture the extent to which we both pursued our academic interests, whilst also participating in the intellectual and social life of Wiko and Berlin. The report begins with a detailed account of how I pursued my general field of research in human rights. It then turns to discuss how Caroline pursued her general field of research in tropical botany. Finally, we describe our broader set of engagements whilst at Wiko. It has been a wonderful year.

General Field of Research

The general field that my research involves is human rights law. The approach adopted was "law-led" but informed by other disciplinary perspectives. My research built on my previous work and develops an integrated theory of comparative human rights law. By an "integrated" theory, I mean that I consider the phenomenon of human rights law from several differing legal and non-legal perspectives. The aim was to bring together and bridge these differing perspectives in a way that enables a description of human rights law to emerge that explains not just the legal rules and principles, but their context as well. The legal perspectives drawn on are: comparative law, international law, several "external" approaches to law (including political theory, for example) and legal practice.

Eight broad areas of research are involved: (i) human rights and history, (ii) the philosophical foundations of human rights (including, in particular, human dignity as one of the foundations of human rights), (iii) the relationship between human rights and religion, (iv) human rights in conflict situations, (v) the relationship between human rights and economic instruments, (vi) the institutional implementation of human rights, in particular the role of courts and judicial reasoning, (vii) human rights in international law and (viii) the role of comparative methodology and human rights.

From these broad themes, it will be seen that I need to engage with a variety of different scholarly disciplines: law, philosophy, theology, politics and economics. My aim is to produce a range of papers across these broad themes and present as many of them as possible to a diverse range of audiences in order to gather critical responses, before attempting to publish the results of these endeavours in a short book. In terms of my time at Wiko, all but (iv) and (v) were addressed in one way or another in papers produced during my tenure.

Human Rights Histories

In the context of my first theme, discussing recent historical studies of the emergence of human rights, I have addressed the idea that human rights are both timeless, in the sense that they embody basic values that are not subject to change, but also adaptable to changing ideas of what being human involves. The main output of this work was a substantial article, entitled "Human Rights Histories" and published in September 2014 (2015) in 35 *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies* 179–212. This article led to an invitation from Arnd Bauerkämper

of the Freie Universität Berlin to present a paper to his graduate research seminar on comparative and entangled history on October 20, 2014 and to an invitation to join on a Panel at the Conference on Human Rights and History, 10th International Human Rights Forum, Lucerne, Switzerland, May 8–9, 2015.

One of the emerging issues in human rights historiography is the extent to which what we currently consider to be human rights derive from previous instantiations of rights. One of the foundational concepts underpinning human rights is the idea of "human dignity", and so a critical question is from when current understandings of human dignity date. In addition to the *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies* article, which sketches a response to this question, I worked on the draft of an article on the development of the Preamble to the 1937 Irish Constitution, which was the first European constitution to use the term dignity as a central meta-principle. This involved research in various archives to explore the question of the degree to which pre-1945 constitutional texts adopted a "modern" human rights understanding and has also involved working with an Irish-language colleague at Queen's University, Belfast on the Irish-language drafting of the 1937 Irish Constitution and what this tells us about the meaning of "dignity" at that time (as well as raising intriguing questions on how such concepts are translated from country to country). A paper based on this research formed the basis of my Tuesday Colloquium at Wiko. I was delighted with the response.

Human Dignity and Human Rights

Modern conceptions of human rights often ground such rights in the idea of "human dignity", as I've suggested. The concept of human dignity has probably never been so omnipresent in everyday speech or so deeply embedded in political and legal discourse. In debates on welfare reform, or in addressing the effects of the current economic crisis, appeals to dignity are seldom hard to find. The concept of dignity is not only a prominent feature of political debate, but also, and increasingly, of legal argument.

It has become increasingly clear that "human dignity" is a central but increasingly contested term. Apparently rival conceptions of the human person and the common good of society are emerging from this concept. Addressing the fundamentals of human dignity, and thereby furthering our understanding of how we might better comprehend the concept, has never seemed more opportune. Exploring these themes has been a central element in my strategy in exploring the idea of human rights.

During my year at Wiko, several of my papers on various aspects of the relationship between dignity and human rights were published or prepared for publication based on work that I had completed before coming to Wiko. These were: "Labour Law as (European) Human Rights Law: A Critique of the Use of 'Dignity' in Freedland and Countouris." In *The Autonomy of Labour Law*, ed. by Alan Bogg, Cathryn Costello, A. C. L. Davies, Jeremias Prassl, 275 (Hart, 2015); and "Dignity and the Challenge to Liberty: Reading Andras Sajo's Constitutional Sentiments." In *Freedom and its Enemies: The Tragedy of Liberty*, ed. by Renáta Uitz, 127 (Boom Eleven International, 2015). I also significantly revised another paper, "Portraying Human Dignity", which is a reflection on dignity in light of Velazquez's *Las Meninas* and will be published in a forthcoming book on human dignity resulting from several conferences organized by *Recht im Kontext* at the Wiko. I presented a version of this at the Human Rights Conference, organized by Bard College, Berlin, April 25, 2015. In revising this paper, I enjoyed, and profited enormously from, conversations with Wiko Fellows Aden Kumler and David Freedberg.

Whilst at Wiko, I completed drafts of two new papers exploring the relationship between dignity and human rights. The first was a paper (with Jeff King) on "The Dark Side of Nudging: the Ethics, Political Economy and Law of Libertarian Paternalism", which arose from our separate presentations to the *Verfassungsblog* Conference, "Choice Architecture in Democracies: Exploring the Legitimacy of Nudging", at Humboldt University, Berlin, January 12–14, 2015. A version of this paper was also presented to a *Recht in Kontext* Abendkolloquium at Wiko.

Our article presents a critique of Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler's advocacy of libertarian paternalism, a philosophy of government regulation that favours using choice-preserving "nudging" as a regulatory intervention. Nudging is sometimes an addition to, but is often in competition with, traditional regulatory mandates (such as legal prohibitions on smoking in restaurants) and economic incentive-based regulation (such as reducing the tax on "green" electricity to increase demand). "A nudge", according to Sunstein and Thaler, "is any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people's behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid. Nudges are not mandates." In our article, we explain why the philosophy of "libertarian paternalism" and "nudging" are seriously flawed, in light of our understanding of human dignity. We are currently revising the paper for publication. We have benefitted enormously from conversations on the issues raised with several Wiko Fellows,

in particular Christoph Möllers, Dieter Grimm, Bruce Ackerman and Susan Rose-Ackerman.

The second major paper, currently entitled "Human Rights: Law, Politics and Philosophy", grew out of an invited presentation to the Conference on "Justification Beyond the State", Yale University, December 5, 2014 and was subsequently revised and refined as a result of discussion at that conference. Subsequent versions were presented at the Workshop on the Future of Human Rights: Conceptual Foundations, Norms and Institutions, Utrecht University, May 27–29, 2015 and at the Seminar, "Rethinking Law in a Global Context: Law's Conception of Politics and Political Conceptions of Law", Humboldt University, Berlin, June 2, 2015.

The paper provides a critique of recent philosophical approaches to the concept of human rights. Philosophers who write about human rights have observed a divide in the discipline between what has been termed a practice-independent approach to the definition and scope of human rights, on the one hand, and a practice-dependent approach, on the other. Practice-dependent approaches identify human rights on the basis of reasons created within particular historical, cultural, social or institutional contexts – the "practice" of human rights (I shall return to this below). In practice-independent approaches, however, existing practices and existing institutions are not considered to play a vital role in the content, scope and justification of human rights. The priority, in the case of practice-independent approaches, instead, is first to reflect on what the concept under discussion requires as a matter of principle through methods of reasoning and intuition, rather than through examination of actual practice.

I argue that both practice-independent and practice-dependent approaches need to be significantly modified from their currently most influential versions. A practice-dependent approach, properly undertaken, reveals that for several human rights actors, human rights is best understood in a top-down form, and therefore this "orthodox" (or practice-independent) approach, paradoxically, becomes an element of human rights practice. Two meta-principles seem to emerge as strong contenders for being the underpinning, normative meta-principles that currently operate. The first is pluralism. And the second is human dignity. The fact that they are both in play means that the conception of human dignity that operates is fundamental but thin. It is fundamental because it not only provides a convincing starting point, but also provides an important limit on what might otherwise have been a worryingly relativistic account. It is thin because our ontological understanding of what it means to be human is a continuing process. Most significantly,

my revised approach supports a dialogic understanding of the normativity of human rights. The most convincing account is that philosophical and legal accounts of human rights practice are both dependent on and independent of each other. I am currently revising this paper for publication. It has been a particular pleasure engaging in several intense and extensive discussions with Sebastian Rödl on these issues.

Religion and Human Rights

One of the most intriguing issues that arises from my research is the relationship between two normative systems: the system of human rights law and the system of religious norms. The third theme I have been working on during my Wiko year involves the relationship between religion and human rights and addresses the humanistic nature of human rights, in the sense that they are not based on any particular set of religious principles or beliefs but are nevertheless broadly consistent with the major religions.

During my year at Wiko, several papers on various aspects of the relationship between dignity and human rights were published or prepared for publication based on work that I had completed before coming to Wiko. These were: "Reva Siegel and the Role of Religion in Constructing the Meaning of 'Human Dignity'." In *Religion and Human Rights Discourse*, ed. by Hanoch Dagan, Shahar Lifshitz and Yedidia Z. Stern (Israel Democracy Institute, 2014); "Benedict's Legacy: Human Rights, Human Dignity, and the Possibility of Dialogue." In *Pope Benedict XVI's Legal Thought: A Dialogue on the Foundation of Law*, ed. by Marta Cartabia and Andrea Simoncini, 165 (Cambridge University Press, 2015); "Faith-based Non-Governmental Organizations in the Public Square." In *Changing Nature of Religious Rights Under International Law*, ed. by Malcolm Evans, Peter Petkoff and Julian Rivers (Oxford University Press, 2015).

Whilst at Wiko, I completed drafts of a paper and a book that explore aspects of the relationship between religion and human rights. The paper grew out of my involvement, as a legal practitioner, with the *Ladele* case, in which the issue was whether the European Convention on Human Rights prevented a marriage registrar in London from being dismissed on the ground of her refusal on religious grounds to conduct same-sex civil partnership ceremonies. I presented the draft of a paper on "Individual Freedom of Religion versus Non-Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom (in the application of Ms. Ladele)", at a Symposium "(How) Should the European Court of Human Rights Resolve Conflicts Between Human Rights?", organized

by the Human Rights Centre of Ghent University, to be held in Belgium on October 16, 2014. A further iteration of this paper will be presented at a Conference at Cardozo Law School, New York, in September 2015.

In this exploration of religion and human rights, my principal work involved preparing the Alberico Gentili Lectures at the University of Macerata, Italy, which I delivered in April 2015. The lectures are named after Alberico Gentili, a Protestant dissident who, in the late sixteenth century, escaped with his family from the religious persecution he had been suffering, ending up as Professor of Law at Oxford and becoming one of the first European scholars in public international law. Oxford University Press has agreed to publish these lectures in English, and the Italian publishing house il Mulino will be publishing the lectures in Italian. The book is (provisionally) entitled: *Litigating Religions: Religion, Law and Human Rights*.

The book argues that when courts deal with disputes involving the tensions between organized religions and human rights, they recurrently face three fundamental problems. As a shorthand way of describing them I called them the "teleological" problem, the "epistemological" problem and the "ontological" problem. These problems are not restricted to the judicial adjudication of claims in the area of religion, but few other areas of litigation consistently involve all three problems at such a high level of intensity. By the teleological problem, I mean the problem that the courts face of deciding what the primary human rights protections relating specifically to religion are for, what their aim or telos is. By the epistemological problem, I mean the problem of how we are to understand normative systems other than those to which we are committed. The problem is how those involved in one normative system, say judges in human rights interpretation, can understand another normative system, say Judaism, sufficiently well to be able to adjudicate when conflicts arise that depend on an understanding of that other normative system.

The most intriguing problem in many ways, however, is the ontological problem, by which I mean the problem of what it means to be human. The ontological problem, so understood, arises in two particular respects. The first is the need to give content to the "human" in "human rights", and we see religions and legal interpretation giving diverse, and sometimes conflicting, answers to this question. One of the contested sites of this conflict is how we are to understand the idea of "human dignity", which is seen by several religions and by the human rights system as a foundational concept for the understanding of human rights. The second respect in which the ontological problem arises has to do with the relationship between what it means to be human and the place of religion in that

understanding, with several religions viewing religion as central to our view of what it means to be human and therefore conceiving protections for religion as central to the human rights enterprise. In the human rights context, however, there appears to be increasing skepticism whether religion should be part of human rights protections at all, and certainly whether it should be seen as central to the human rights enterprise.

Courts, Institutions and Human Rights

The next strand, or theme, of my Wiko research involved examining the institutional interpretation and application of human rights. Human rights law is rooted in legal discourse and uses legal mechanisms, but is also deeply imbued with political calculation and moral values. How do these interrelate, and what does the way they interrelate tell us about the nature of human rights law? Of course, many institutions have responsibilities for interpreting and applying human rights standards. I was invited to explore some issues relating to the application of the idea of the "rule of law" by European Union political institutions, particularly focusing on the situation in Hungary, at the Wiko group convened by Susan Rose-Ackerman that met to consider developments in the European Union.

My principal focus in this strand of work, however, has been on the relationship between the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). In December 2014, the CJEU decided in Opinion 2/13 that a draft agreement under which the European Union would accede to the European Convention on Human Rights was contrary to European law. Under the auspices of the University of Michigan Law School and Wiko, my colleague at Michigan, Daniel Halberstam, a former Wiko Fellow and current member of Wiko's Academic Advisory Board, and I convened a small, closed-door, high-level working group on "EU Accession after Opinion 2/13: the Way Forward". The meeting took place at Wiko on June 8, 2015. The discussion involved a full day of discussion among all the key institutional actors and a handful of academics and other relevant prominent figures to explore, under Chatham House Rule, concrete steps of moving EU accession to the ECHR forward.

Human Rights and International Law

The issue of the relationship between human rights and international law, particularly international human rights law, is another significant theme that I have been exploring in several articles. During my year at Wiko, I prepared a significant paper on this theme for publication, based primarily on work that I had completed before coming to Wiko: "Human Rights, *Southern Voices*, and 'Traditional Values' at the United Nations." Forthcoming in *Law's Ethical, Global and Theoretical Contexts: Essays in Honour of William Twining*, ed. by Upendra Baxi, Christopher McCrudden and Abdul Paliwala (Cambridge University Press, 2016). This considers recent attempts at the United Nations to reorient the interpretation of existing human rights treaties towards "traditional values".

The edited volume in which this article appears is a *Festschrift for Professor William Twining*, which was also completed and submitted for publication to Cambridge University Press during my time at Wiko. Coincidentally, it focuses on several of the themes that I have been working on at Wiko, in particular the relationship between legal theory, globalization and third-world approaches to human rights.

My principal work on this theme at Wiko involved exploring the implications of the evolving sub-discipline of "comparative international law". I produced a lengthy paper for the first conference on the topic at the Workshop on Comparative International Law, 27th Annual Sokol Colloquium, University of Virginia Law School, Charlottesville, Virginia, September 5, 2014. For this, I conducted an analysis of 324 national judicial decisions, across 55 jurisdictions, in which the reported decision referred to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).

Following this conference, it was decided that there should be an edited volume on the issues raised, to be published by Oxford University Press, edited by Anthea Roberts, Paul Stephan, Pierre-Hugues Verdier and Mila Versteg, and entitled *Comparative International Law* (forthcoming in 2016). At Wiko, I finalized two chapters for this volume. The first, "Comparative International Human Rights Law", provides an assessment of implications of the turn for our understanding of international human rights. The second, "Operationalizing The Comparative International Human Rights Law Method: A Case Study of CEDAW in National Courts", describes the methodological and conceptual issues that arose from an extensive study I completed on how national courts worldwide refer to CEDAW. In revising the paper for publication, I was fortunate to be able to discuss the issues at Christoph Möller's graduate research seminar at Humboldt University in October 2014.

In addition, and a clear indication of the emerging interest in the sub-discipline, the *American Journal of International Law* is publishing a symposium in which my article "Why Do National Court Judges Refer to Human Rights Treaties? A Comparative International Law Analysis of CEDAW" will be published. It suggests that, despite predictions to the contrary based on previous scholarship, significant variations between courts in their interpretation of CEDAW occurred relatively infrequently, courts referred relatively seldom to other national courts' interpretations of CEDAW and there was little evidence of transnational dialogic approaches to judging. An analysis suggests that domestic judges invoking CEDAW act primarily as domestic actors who use international law to advance domestic goals, rather than acting primarily as agents of the international community in applying CEDAW domestically or than in contributing to the transnational shaping of international law to suit national interests. The article suggests an understanding of the domestic implementation of a human rights treaty as not only law, but also a unique kind of law that performs a particular function, in light of its quality as something akin to hard and soft law simultaneously.

Comparative Methodology

My engagement with comparative international law overlaps with the last major theme of my work, issues of comparative methodology and human rights. This considers the extent to which human rights purports not to be rooted in any particular region of the globe and appeals across cultures, but is nevertheless sensitive to regional differences. Human rights are international, transnational and global in orientation, but most of the work is also done domestically and locally. I am particularly interested in why the comparative method appears to be such a significant feature of the development and interpretation of human rights standards and what this says about the nature of human rights.

Whilst at Wiko, I completed two papers that grow out of this theme. The first, entitled "Transnational Culture Wars", considers the evolving use of comparative arguments by NGOs in the United States Supreme Court and before the European Court of Human Rights. This is forthcoming in the *International Journal of Constitutional Law,* to be published in 2015. The second article brings together a discussion of human rights and the comparative method with debates over the contours of global constitutionalism. This paper was originally presented as part of the University of Pennsylvania Program on Democracy, Citizenship and Constitutionalism. A much-revised version is now forthcoming under

the title "Dignity, Rights and the Comparative Method." In *Making Modern Constitutions*, ed. by Rogers M. Smith and Richard R. Beeman (University of Pennsylvania Press, forthcoming).

I also had the opportunity whilst at Wiko to deepen my understanding of comparative and transnational approaches in two particular ways. The first was by attending and speaking at a Conference on "Constitutional Migration and Transjudicialism beyond the North Atlantic", held at the Herrenhausen Palace, Hanover, June 3–6, 2015. The second way, completely unexpected, was by learning about how different disciplines engage in comparisons, which came to be called "comparing comparisons". The heart of the exploration is a hypothesis, or perhaps an intuition, that comparing how and why different disciplines do or do not make use of the "comparative method" can tell us something useful about the use of comparison generally and about the use of comparison in each discipline. The project began with conversations with Guy Stroumsa early in my time as a Fellow at Wiko and continued subsequently in the context of an informal group that I convened, which met occasionally for an hour before dinner on Thursdays.

The composition of the group changed over time, but at one time or another comprised Guy Stroumsa, Sarah Stroumsa, Françoise Lavocat, Meredith Reiches, Otto Pfersmann, Aden Kumler, Bruce Ackerman, Shermin de Silva, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Caroline McCrudden and Richard Bourke. Occasionally, other Fellows and former Fellows were invited to share with us their thoughts on the use of the comparative method in their own work and in their discipline more generally. The following additional Fellows were kind enough to participate in this way: Charlotte Klonk, Yongle Zhang, Jan-Hendrik Hofmeyr, Brandon Kilbourne, Robert Martin, Lea Ypi, Christoph Möllers and Luca Giuliani. Some of us hope to continue co-operating on this work in the next few years.

Caroline's Academic Work

Caroline, a tropical botanist, has also had a remarkably stimulating year. Her main work this year has been to prepare an outline proposal for a major grant application, involving the research facilities of the Botanisches Museum Library (Freie Universität) and the Wiko Library. She completed writing the proposal in May 2015 and it will be the basis for grant applications in future. By way of background, it is important to understand that, throughout human history, there has been a fundamental question about how to recognize species in nature. This raises two questions: what is a biologically meaningful species, and

how do we achieve correct species delimitations? We can say that a species is a group of individuals that are similar to each other and share a common ancestor that they do not share with any other group of individuals. There are several reasons why this is important. Pre-Darwin, and still of great practical importance post-Darwin, it is foundational to achieving consistency of the names used in communication of information on species (be it on edibility, medicinal uses, conservation or ecology). Since Darwin, one of the additional purposes of classification is to enable us to develop evolutionary and historical information concerning plants and animals over time.

A primary question is what methods are to be used to produce the required classification. In the context of the classification of animals, one of the most popular methods is to apply the test of interfertility (i.e. individuals of the same species can interbreed and produce fertile offspring, whilst those of different species cannot). Most modern textbooks follow Ernst Mayr's definition, known as the Biological Species Concept of a species as "groups of actually or potentially interbreeding natural populations, which are reproductively (genetically) isolated from other such groups".

In the plant context this is not a practical method. So, how is *plant* classification achieved? The starting point is that there is a continuity in characters within the same species, and a discontinuity in characters between one species and its nearest relatives. (This can be a discontinuity in the degree to which a character is manifested.) In the first instance, classification of plants is based on their appearance, a practice referred to as morphology. Morphological characters are the primary means of recognizing and delimiting species in multi-cellular organisms.

Part of what Caroline does as a taxonomist is to identify plants from dried specimens in herbaria, the plant equivalent of libraries. For example, she determined all *Aglaia* collections in Berlin, finding two types for names not previously typified. These were duplicates of types destroyed in the bombing of the Botanisches Museum (BGBM) and the ensuing fire of 1943. She has also spent three days working in botanical collections and library at Naturalis in Leiden.

However, there is a problem. Modern classifications of living organisms aim to define taxa that fall into discrete clades, and are therefore *monophyletic,* as distinct from taxa that combine entities that resemble each other in morphological characters, but are only distantly related and therefore *paraphyletic*. (Incidentally, there are apparently equivalent problems elsewhere: the problem of pseudo-morphology is one of the biggest problems facing art history: that is, when things look the same and are not.) Paraphyletic species

have been identified in diverse groups of organisms, but, in many of them, have not been resolved into their constituent monophyletic species.

A principal way of addressing the challenge of delimiting monophyletic species in taxonomically complex groups of organisms is by applying DNA sequencing. It takes the results of a morphological classification and calculates the relationships between species by comparing sequences of the four nucleotides (adenine, guanine, thymine and cytosine) from a small part of the genome. A major contribution of DNA sequencing for classification has been to establish the relationships between species by constructing branching "trees", known as phylogenies. If fossils of known age can be applied to nodes on the "tree", it can be calibrated and the timing of the appearance of groups of species can be estimated to provide information about the likely course of evolution in the group.

However, even if DNA sequences can be used to delimit species reliably, it would still be necessary to write a morphological description and a key for identifying living organisms and museum specimens, in order to make practical use of the classification in most spheres of enquiry. Attempts to do this any other way are still in their infancy and show no signs of replacing the traditional morphological methods. The grant proposal aims to develop proposals for how these two methods can best be brought together to develop practical methods of answering the age-old question "what is a species?".

This issue was also at the heart of the colloquium she presented in May 2015, using 120 species of tropical mahogany trees as a case study from fieldwork to classification, biogeography and evolution to molecular phylogeny, historical biogeography, colonization of new territories millions of years ago and subsequent radiations into suites of new species. The presentation provoked heated discussion between (some) scientists and philosophers, leading to a three-hour follow-up session and e-mail exchanges with Sebastian Rödl and Andrea Kern. She hopes that they might be able to continue to explore the subject with a meeting of a larger, multi-disciplinary group in the future.

Also as part of her academic work, Caroline took full advantage of being in Germany. She attended and presented a poster at the International Biogeographical Society conference in Bayreuth, January 6–13, 2015; she attended a field meeting in the Kaiserstuhl and the Südschwarzwald to explore the habitats and diversity of species of mosses and liverworts in southwestern Germany; she presented her research on *Aglaia* to the May staff meeting at the Botanischer Garten und Botanisches Museum; she made several visits to the Museum für Naturkunde, including meetings with Michael Ohl and Thomas von Rintelen; and she attended a presentation explaining 3D scanning of museum specimens.

Taking Advantage of Wiko, Berlin and Germany

Apart from our academic work, described above, we threw ourselves into the activities that Wiko provided, as well as making some new opportunities. We both attended the excellent Intensive German course at the beginning of the year, followed by four hours or more of lessons per week for the rest of the year. Caroline participated in WIST, "Women in Science Tea" meetings, convened by Meredith Reiches. Having established a connection with the Director of the Museum für Naturkunde, Johannes Vogel, and his wife, Sarah Darwin, Caroline arranged a tour of the Museum für Naturkunde for Fellows and Partners, January 30, 2015. This has initiated a continuing contact between MfN and Wiko. Similarly, she arranged a tour of the Botanischer Garten, led by Thomas Raus, for Fellows, partners and staff on July 8, 2015.

We both immensely enjoyed attending wonderful concerts at the Philharmonie and the Konzerthaus, as well as operas and ballet at the Staatsoper and the Komische Oper. We also took full advantage of the many excellent museums in Berlin, not least because Aden Kumler was such a generous guide. Between us, we managed to visit the Pergamonaltar (now closed) in the Pergamonmuseum (with a fascinating talk by Luca Giuliani), the Brecht-Weigel-Haus, the Haus der Wannsee-Konferenz, the Gemäldegalerie, the Kunstgewerbemuseum, the Bode-Museum, the Museum für Naturkunde, the Botanischer Garten, the Botanisches Museum, the Helmut Newton Foundation, the Vivian Maier exhibition at the Willy-Brandt-Haus, the Brücke-Museum, the East Side Gallery, Schloss Sanssouci, the Ethnologisches Museum and the Zoologischer Garten.

Caroline also participated in four dawn-chorus and bird-watching outings, as far afield as Schwedt on the River Oder, and three at dusk, mostly with Jan-Hendrik Hofmeyr. She hopes to continue her shared interest in natural history with Jannie, with planned trips to the Namib Desert and Okavango, as well as the Cape and other South African wildlife and flora localities. Christopher was less involved with the natural history of the region, but we both visited Stolpe an der Peene and Usedom in January and returned to Stolpe in June, completing a 20-km return canoe trip from Anklam to Stolpe.

Conclusion

We are deeply grateful to Wiko for the immense privilege of having had the opportunity to experience this immense range of academic and non-academic pursuits during the

academic years 2014/15, which would not have been possible without the support of the staff and other Fellows. It would be hard to overestimate the effects of the Fellowship and our time in Berlin on our intellectual and scholarly development and in our academic productivity. We hope that others will also be as fortunate as us in being able to take full advantage of the opportunities (intellectual and social) that the Fellowship accorded us. Christopher would also like to thank Queen's University and the University of Michigan for granting Christopher research leave to take up the Fellowship. It was, quite simply, a life-changing year for us both. Thank you, Wiko.