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Conclusions from the 20th Century: How War, Mass Murder and Famine Are Related to Democracy and Dictatorship¹

Among the many things I have learned at the Wissenschaftskolleg is: please start by referring to a famous German philosopher, preferably someone who has been dead for a very long time. Of course, my choice is Immanuel Kant. More than 200 years ago, in Königsberg, he published the famous essay “Zum ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf”.

Kant imagined a future world with “a union of liberal republics”. These countries would be wise enough to feel close to and friendly towards one another. They would therefore never go to war against each other. Peace could prevail. Statesmanship and common sense would establish institutions restraining the egoistic and aggressive traits of human beings.

In 1795, there was no democracy on earth and none had ever existed – in the sense I will define. The liberal republics were an abstract idea in the mind of the philosopher. Immanuel Kant could know almost nothing about their perpetual peace. But he *imagined* it and entered deep into his own vision.

Today we know that it has never happened in history that two democracies have gone to war against each other. A large number of scholars have researched this area. In the 1990s, most of them have come to share the same conviction: that democracies have created a “mutual peace”. Free nations have established “peace zones”, etc.

The present position of the most brilliant experts on this topic – Bruce Russett, Michael W. Doyle, James Lee Ray, R. J. Rummel, Zeev Maoz, Spencer R. Weart, and several others – has been formulated by Jack Levy: “The absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations”.

They have focused on *interstate* wars (not civil wars) *between independent nations*; wars which have led not to a very limited amount of casualties but to a fairly large number of soldiers killed in battle. And they have asked: have there been any such wars between democratic nations?

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Partly, the answer depends on how you define “democracy” and “war”, and I’ll come back to that. Let me first mention a few studies. All wars from about 1816 to about 1991 have been analyzed. To calculate the statistical significance of democracies not making war on each other, these researchers have investigated “pairs” or “dyads” to create and analyze “bilateral wars” within wars with several participants. So, if there are several countries on one side or both sides in a war, with this method you can find out whether two democracies have ever fought each other.

There have been 353 “pairs” of nations in the about 70 wars that have been waged during this period of roughly 175 years. Among those “pairs” of countries at war, a non-democracy fought another non-democracy in 198 cases. A democracy fought a non-democracy in 155 cases. A democracy against another democracy: ZERO wars. There is no exception.

Or let us look at Dean Babst’s analysis of the two World Wars. 33 independent countries were involved in World War I. Ten were democracies. They never fought each other.

52 independent nations took part in World War II. Fourteen of the fifteen democracies were on the same side. Finland, though, waged war against the Soviet Union in a kind of cooperation with Nazi Germany, and Stalin succeeded in pressuring Great Britain to formally declare war on Finland. However, no fighting whatsoever took place between Finland and any of the other free nations, including Britain. In short, no democracies shot at each other in World War II, either.

But the *definitions* are often crucial here. They are arbitrary, of course, but still you have to define. If possible, the definition should be fairly concrete, easy to apply, useful in understanding the problem we are studying, compatible with our general notion about the concept we discuss and acceptable to most scholars in this area.

The major books on this topic make a number of suggestions. The basic problem when defining “democracy” is this: it is not practical to stick to a short and generally accepted definition appreciated in our *contemporary* debate. For example, democracy today is seen as “government based on free elections, with one vote for each adult, under political freedom for the opposition and the mass media”.

But *our* research purpose is somewhat different from making judgments on countries in the world today. With the definition I just summarized, we would find no democracy during the 19th century, and very few democracies up to the end of World War I. Any country without the right to vote for women is immediately ruled out. And the fewer democracies you have to analyze, the more unlikely it is to find a war between them. So you have to broaden the definition to bring more countries into the analysis and thus make the conclusions more convincing.

In short: the more “dogmatic” or “tight” your definition is, the more difficult it becomes to reach significant conclusions. And the “broader” or more “generous” you are when defining “democracy”, the greater the possibility that you will come up with illuminating results. Up to a point, of course. If you include obviously semi-authoritarian governments and call them “democracies”, you won’t reach conclusions of any value.

These problems are carefully discussed by James Lee Ray in his book *Democracy and International Conflict* (1995). His definitions are often very close to what a number of other scholars suggest, and I now refer to Professor Ray’s analysis.

First, what is “democracy” in this context? Ray has chosen his words carefully:

We will consider a state to be democratic if the identities of the leaders of its executive branch and the membership in the national legislature are determined in competitive, fair elections. We shall recognize electoral systems as competitive and fair as long as they involve at least two formally independent political parties, confer suffrage on at least half of the adult population, and produce at least one peaceful, constitutional transfer of power between opposing political parties, groups, factions, or coalitions.

Two parts of this definition are especially interesting. First, Ray states that if *half* of the adult population has the right to vote he regards that country as a democracy. When he explains what “competitive, fair elections” are, he suggests a functional definition about at least two independent parties and at least one peaceful transfer of power.

Further definitions: “interstate wars” should involve independent, *sovereign states* on both sides of a military conflict. The criteria for statehood is a population of at least 500,000 people. The “independence” of a state of up to World War I is considered given if both France and England had established diplomatic missions. After World War I, the independence of a state is evidenced by its membership in the League of Nations or the United Nations and by having received diplomatic missions from any two major powers. And a “war” is defined as a military conflict with at least 1,000 battle deaths.

Now, certain scholars, not too many, do claim that there are cases when democracies have or might have waged war against each other. Also, historians who deny this regard some of these cases as “close calls”, which should be discussed. Let us briefly look at 19 of these alleged “exceptions” and apply Ray’s definitions to them. There are often *several* reasons why those conflicts should not be seen as wars between democracies, but I usu-

ally mention only one or two. Half of the cases took place more than a hundred years ago; the rest are from our century.

Athens versus Syracuse, 415–413 B.C. (First, a large number of people in Athens were slaves, and the female half of the population could not participate politically. So, considerably *less* than half of the people had the right to vote. Second, a number of the most important governmental leaders in Athens were not selected in competitive elections).

United Provinces versus England, 1780–1783. (Just about one fifth of the adult male population could participate in the English elections. Regarding the United Provinces: even as late as 1800, only 12 percent of the adult population in the Netherlands had the right to vote).

The English versus the French during the French Revolutionary Wars, 1792–1802. (Again, only a small percentage of adult males were eligible to participate in British elections up to the end of the 19th century).

England versus the United States, 1812. (See above).

Belgium versus Holland, 1830. (This was hardly an interstate war. Holland and Belgium constituted a quasi-federal state, which was not democratic either. Also, the conflict was probably not lethal enough to be regarded as a “war”).

Swiss Civil War, 1847. (Yes, it was a civil war, not an interstate war. The number of casualties was probably less than 80 – bad enough, but not a “war” according to our definition.)

Rome (Papal States) versus France, 1849. (Both states were at this time relatively unfree. The French President Louis Napoleon, elected under a new constitution, never proved that he could be replaced after a free election. On the contrary, in a coup in 1851, he declared himself Emperor).

American Civil War, 1861–1865. (This case is often discussed as a possible exception, but of course it is not. First, it was a civil war, not an interstate war. Second, the leaders of the Confederacy (the South) were hardly democratically elected: 35 to 40 percent of its population were slaves, and women had no right to vote, etc.).

Spanish-American War, 1898. (It is true that half of the population of the US had the right to vote, so our definition makes it a democracy. Also, Spanish men had the right to vote. But the peaceful transfers of power in Spain were *arranged* between the two major parties and the monarch. The elections were grossly manipulated, not least by vote fraud. The King could appoint a minister from the opposition and then dissolve parliament.

Half of the Senate was not elected, and neither was the King. The Spanish system sometimes *looked* democratic, but was not.)

Second Philippines War, 1899. (The US, according to the definition was a democracy; the Philippines was not. It did not become an independent state until 1946. The US war was waged against the movement that previously led the insurrection against the Spanish. Its leader ran his temporary government in a non-democratic way).

Boer War, 1899–1902. (The white population of the republics of South Africa was less than 500,000. Many white males did not have the right to vote. Neither could women nor, of course, the black population. In the Orange Free State, the black Africans were probably about one-third of the population, and they were given no say in politics).

World War I. (The German emperor was not just a figurehead: *he* appointed the Chancellor, whom he could also dismiss. He had direct authority over the army and played an active role in foreign affairs. And because the emperor was not elected in fair, competitive elections, Germany cannot be seen as a democracy).

Finland versus Great Britain in World War II. (I have already discussed this case).

Israel versus Lebanon, 1948. (Lebanon at the time was not a democracy. Israel had no elected government, since the country had not had time to hold elections before war broke out).

India versus Pakistan, 1948 and later. (Pakistan was then not a democracy, and this initial clash between the two countries involved less than 1,000 casualties. In the two later military confrontations with India, in 1965 and 1971, Pakistan was a sort of dictatorship. During Pakistan's most democratic periods, 1962–64 and 1988–92, there was no military conflict between the two countries).

Lebanon versus Israel, 1967. (Lebanon did not engage in extensive military confrontation with Israel in the Six-Day War).

Turkey versus Cyprus, 1974. (Cyprus had just collapsed in a bloody coup carried out by the Greek military junta. In Turkey, civilian rule had been restored but not established in the way the definition demands).

Peru versus Ecuador, 1981 and later. (The casualties were very few, etc.).

Conflicts in the Post-Communist World. (Serbia was and is not democratic, according to the definition. Thus, none of the several conflicts involving Serbia is a war between democratic states. When it comes to the war

between Armenia and Azerbaijan, neither of their governments has had a peaceful transfer of power between independent political parties).

So, we have found that none of these 19 cases undermines the so-called “democratic peace proposition”. That does not say that a war between countries that live up to the definitions can be ruled out also in the future. Especially these days, it is more than imaginable that India and Pakistan, under democratic leaderships, could wage war against each other over Kashmir. And a Greek-Turkish confrontation could probably happen in the worst of cases.

But such a case has never, to this day, occurred. What we *guess* about the future here is less relevant. The major discovery is that democracies have never fought each other. It is also most interesting to find out why.

Let me concentrate on Professor Bruce Russett and his book *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (1995). His answer is that democracies do not fight each other for reasons that fall into two categories. The first group of explanations is called “Democratic Norms and Culture”. They are built on studies of a number of conflicts, which either led to war or did not lead to war. Why the difference?

The major finding by Russett and others has to do with how decision-makers look upon other countries. Violent conflicts between democracies will be rare, he writes, because:

In democracies, the relevant decision-makers expect to be able to resolve conflicts by compromise and nonviolence, respecting the rights and continued existence of opponents.

Therefore democracies will follow norms of peaceful conflict resolution with other democracies, and will expect other democracies to do so with them.

The more stable the democracy, the more democratic norms will govern its behaviour with other democracies, and the more other democracies will expect democratic norms to govern its international behaviour.

If violent conflicts between democracies do occur, at least one of the democracies is likely to be politically unstable.

The second group of factors explaining the democratic peace Russett calls “Structural and Institutional Constraints”. Again, I quote his conclusions.

Violent conflicts between democracies will be infrequent, he says, because:

In democracies, the constraints of checks and balances, division of power, and need for public debate to enlist widespread support will slow decisions to use large-scale violence and reduce the likelihood that such decisions will be made.

Leaders of other states will perceive leaders of democracies as so constrained.

Thus leaders of democracies will expect, in conflicts with other democracies, time for processes of international conflict resolution to operate, and they will not fear surprise attack.

Let me escape this academic wording and summarize the same thought in clearer language. In a democracy it is impossible, or at least extremely difficult, to get enough support from the people to initiate a military confrontation with another democracy. Such people know each other too well. They trust each other too much. For democratic governments, it is usually natural to talk and negotiate with one another. It would seem ridiculous or totally irresponsible to start shooting at a nation which is governed in a similar democratic way as your own country.

In their interplay, free nations are almost always “dovish”. They look upon each other as countries belonging to “the same species”.

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And now the opposite: mass murder. I mentioned Professor R. J. Rummel. He is always in one place: Hawaii. A back illness prevents him from travelling by air. When I interviewed him in Honolulu, I started to understand that I had met a great scholar, geographically isolated, maybe, but always in the midst of our century and its catastrophes. 15 years ago, he asked himself the most appalling question: how many people have been killed during our century, outside of war, for political reasons?

Since then Rummel has spent most of his life trying to answer this question. When individuals kill in a civilized society, we call it “murder”. Rummel has given the name “democide” to similar actions performed by governments. The concept of democide is intended to cover all sorts of *intentional* killing of unarmed individuals and people, of course also covering the murders in, for example, genocide.

It should be mentioned here that “genocide”, according to the Geneva Convention of 1948, includes several means other than murder when trying to destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Of course, Rummel only deals with killing (see appendix).

Certain forms of killing might not fit any previous label. Murder by quota. Millions of people disappearing in labour camps simply because they got in the way. Hundreds of thousands of peasants slowly dying of overwork and intentional famine. These cases and many other ways of murdering people are all included in Rummel’s concept of democide. So he tries to cover all intentional government killing in cold blood, and that is comparable to the concept of murder for private killing. You could say, with a simplification, that *democide is genocide AND mass murder, put together*.

What Professor Rummel has done is to go through the 20th century and try to find out how many people have been killed in democide. His figures are based on documents, books, articles, interviews and lots of other sources. In his five volumes on this topic, Rummel has collected and analyzed more than 8,000 estimates from more than a thousand sources.

He then gives the lowest and highest possible figures, respectively, for each massacre, concentration camp, or specific genocide in a country during a certain period of time, etc. After that, he makes his own judgement about the most “likely” figure, somewhat biased toward a prudent, conservative estimate.

Finally Rummel summarizes all his highest, lowest and “likely” figures. Of course the margin of error here is huge. And everything is organized in tables containing more than 18,000 rows.

Every row contains, first, the event or process which is to be estimated (for example, the camp or camps studied, whether it is military killing or executions of civilians, the nationality of the victims, etc.); then the dates, including the month and year of the beginning and end of this “event”; then the lowest and highest estimate of deaths and Rummel’s own judgement on the “mid-estimate” or “likely” death toll of the so-called “event”; then the source (or sources) he refers to; and finally “notes”, which are extra comments on the kind of killing in question and how he solves complications in estimating.

This means that his research is openly described and explained in detail. All his estimates are publicly available. They can be corrected, upward or downward, or confirmed whenever new archives are opened, when new witnesses come forward, and as new research is done.

This method surely makes life easier for his critics, his students and future generations of scholars, journalists, politicians, writers and others. And the period Rummel considers is from 1900 through 1987.

During these 88 years, about 170 million people were killed by democide: for political reasons, not on battlefields. (And regarding the margin of error: the total sum of all the *lowest* estimates, entirely unrealistic, is 76 million. The total sum of all the *highest* estimates, equally unrealistic, is 359 million. And the sum of all the estimates Rummel regards “likely” is 170 million).

The totalitarian states murdered 138 million out of the 170 million. The authoritarian countries killed 28 million.

Democracies have killed about 2 million people – primarily through intentional bombing of civilian targets in war-time. His definition of democide includes, for example, the destruction of Dresden, Hamburg and Hiroshima. These events, as well as Rummel’s definition in this respect, are controversial. But however we view them, they do not change the overall picture. If we change his definition on this point, the number of people killed in democide by democracies in the 20th century is far lower.

Thus, according to Rummel, the dictatorships are responsible for between 98 and 99 percent of the democide in our century. This political killing is about four times more than the death toll on battlefields of wars during the same years.

The three worst killer regimes have been the Soviet Union with about 62 million victims, Communist China with 35 million and Nazi Germany with 21 million. I repeat: these figures tell us about the intentional murder of unarmed people outside the battle areas.

Which government has killed the most people in proportion to its own population? In three and a half years, Pol Pot and Khmer Rouge put to death not less than 2 million people out of 7 million. (Later, Rwanda probably experienced the fastest genocide ever. Again, out of 7 million people, between half a million and one million were killed within *three months* in the spring of 1994).

If the question is which *people* was hardest hit in proportion to its own size, then of course the Holocaust is without parallel. Almost six million Jews were killed out of probably about 9 million under Nazi rule in a large number of European countries, especially Poland. And the proportion of two million murdered Armenians, compared to the total number of Armenians living in Turkey about 15 years earlier, might be even higher. The genocide of Armenians, committed by Turks especially during World War I, is one of the most horrifying and least publicized disasters of the century.

How many men, women and children have been victims of *Communist* regimes? They have killed about 110 million people, almost two-thirds of all political murders during the 88 years in question. Among the 24 Com-

munist regimes, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and Pol Pot's Cambodia are of course the most murderous. But also North Korea, Vietnam and Yugoslavia probably killed more than a one million people each in democide, and Ethiopia was not far behind.

This mass slaughter, according to Rummel, has been triggered by the rage and utopian strivings of Marxists in power. The marriage of an absolutist ideology with absolute power led to the disasters. What makes this secular religion so utterly lethal, Rummel concludes, is

its seizure of all the state's instruments of force and coercion and their immediate use to destroy or control all independent sources of power, such as the church, the professions, private business, schools, organizations and, of course, the family.

Rummel claims that "the most important fact of our time" is that democracy protects lives and dictatorship takes lives. He has shown that between 150 and 200 million people have been shot, knifed, crushed or tortured to death; they were frozen or starved or worked or beaten to death; these unarmed and helpless citizens and foreigners were burned alive, drowned, hanged, bombed, gassed or murdered in innumerable other ways.

So, what is the driving force of such mass killing? Rummel's answer is: the degree of concentration of power and the degree of lack of freedom usually decide whether a government could become a bunch of mass murderers or not. The checks and balances and openness of democracy preserve peace and life. The annihilation of freedom leads to the extermination of human beings.

Rummel reminds us that 170 million murders are as if humankind has been "devastated by a modern plague. And indeed it has, but a plague of power, not germs". Rummel's conclusion is: the main problem is the concentration of power. The solution is democracy. The course of action is to foster freedom.

Professor Rummel has now made it much easier than before for people around the world to study his research. His own homepage, containing about 900 documents/chapters in more than 4,000 pages, is one of Internet's most important web sites: www2.hawaii.edu/~rummel/

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Some people have come to other conclusions. Democracy is not that important for the Third World, they claim. More urgent for people in developing nations is not to go hungry, to have enough to eat.

So let us consult the most well-known expert on famine (mass starvation leading to death): Professor Amartya Sen, the 1998 Nobel Laureate in Economics. During the Bengal famine of 1943, between two and three million people died of hunger. That happened under British colonial rule.

Since India became independent in 1947 and installed a multi-party democratic system, the country has never suffered from this kind of disaster. Undernourishment and malnutrition, certainly. But, as Professor Sen has emphasized, no famine has hit independent, democratic India.

Compare that with the “Great Leap Forward” in Mao’s China, 1958–61. At least 30 million Chinese citizens, probably many more, then died from hunger. (I refer especially to Jasper Becker’s book *Hungry Ghosts*, 1998). 30 million people killed by famines: more than ten times the number of Indians who died in the gigantic starvation in British India less than twenty years before.

(*Hungry Ghosts!* There is at least one indispensable, pioneer book about each of the three big killer regimes. On Nazi genocide: Roger Hilberg’s three volumes *The Destruction of the European Jews*, which first appeared at the beginning of the 60s. On Communism: Robert Conquest’s *The Great Terror* on the Stalin empire in the 30s, which conveyed the terrible facts that were still often dismissed at the end of the 60s, when it was published. And now Jasper Becker’s *Hungry Ghosts* on the worst famine ever – maybe the most terrifying book from the end of our century).

Amartya Sen has also made a number of other comparisons, especially between various African countries which have experienced crop failures and food shortages. For example, Botswana and Zimbabwe had a dramatic fall of food supply between 1979–81 and 1983–84. At the same time, Sudan and Ethiopia experienced a much more modest decline in food supply. But the two latter nations had major famines, while Botswana and Zimbabwe had none. Famine prevention worked in the two southern countries, where the political opposition was vital, while the Ethiopian and Sudanese governments “did not have to reckon with such democratic inconveniences”.

Professor Sen has made the following summary of his most important life achievement as an economist:

One of the remarkable facts in the terrible history of famine is that no substantial famine has ever occurred in a country with a democratic form of government and a relatively free press. They have occurred in ancient kingdoms and in contemporary authoritarian societies, in primitive tribal communities and in modern technocratic dictatorships, in colonial economies governed by imperialists from the north and in newly independent countries of the south

run by despotic leaders or by intolerant single parties. But famines have never afflicted any country that is independent, that goes to elections regularly, that has opposition parties to voice criticism, that permits newspapers to report freely and to question the wisdom of government policies without extensive censorship.²

Again, the crucial factor is freedom. Where there is an active opposition and a free press, governments cannot neglect tens of thousands of people starving to death. When the opposition is silenced and mass media give voice only to the propaganda of the dictator, the fate of millions of people dying from famine can be kept secret and ignored – because of ideology, incompetence, systematic lying and almost total lack of compassion.

So, let me wind up by briefly summarizing what academic research has taught us, especially in the 1990s:

1. No democracy has ever gone to war against another democracy.
2. Democracies rarely commit democide; dictatorships often do. The total number of political killings carried out by countries based on repression is probably about 170 million people, roughly four times more than the number of people killed in battles of war (almost 40 million).
3. Famine has never occurred in a democracy.

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Let me finally make a more personal comment referring to a misunderstanding which is common at least in my country. People on the Left often say: By underlining the quantities of Communist horrors we might make our citizens forget Nazi terror and the Holocaust. And some debaters on the Right claim the opposite: that by systematically teaching young people about the uniqueness of the Holocaust, we dismiss the enormous number of victims of Communist cruelties.

I am not very fond of the notion that we have to choose which totalitarian system we should concentrate our criticism or analysis on.

The destruction of the European Jews is without parallel. This was the only time in history when a whole people were sentenced to death by a great power which carried out that verdict – sentenced because they were Jews; regardless of their opinions or achievements or health or personal traits; regardless also of what country they lived in or if they were com-

² Amartya Sen, “Freedom and Needs”, *The New Republic*, January 10 and 17, 1994.

pletely innocent of any imaginable accusation. Their only crime: they were Jewish, and they had to die for it.

The Communist leaders of this century have taught us something else: that it is possible for a number of governments to continue exterminating human beings for the most ridiculous reasons, or for no reason at all, on the largest scale ever seen, decade after decade after decade, in country after country, around the globe. Communism is also without parallel, since it has probably killed more than 100 million people.

Is it impossible to recognize both of these kinds of uniqueness? Why is it so hard for some people to keep two basic thoughts in their heads at the same time?

I have chosen to quantify and try to find “rules”, connections, general conclusions. Maybe this is a paradox, since my driving force during forty years of writing about totalitarianism has been the victims, those who were tortured and then killed, those who had first to watch a parent, a child or a wife being tormented to death and were then shot themselves. *And victims are always individuals.*

Certainly, the figures I have presented now conceal the individuals. If someone says “five million executions” you probably won’t see any man, woman or child among them. There are limits of our imagination. Yet, I do not apologize for mentioning the figures and general conclusions. Some of you have probably not seen them before. But few of us can relate them to specific human beings. They do hide the individuals.

However, we always have to make a choice. There are hundreds of books describing in detail how tyrants and their henchmen have slowly maltreated to death those who have opposed them, or who have belonged to the wrong class, family, race, people or tribe, or who happened to live in the wrong country or area at the wrong time, or whose profession or friends the rulers did not approve of. That we know. And the latest of the big and well-known volumes, full of graphic descriptions of how to inflict pain on human beings, is probably *The Black Book of Communism*.

Such books are indispensable, but most of them lack something. *How many* were murdered? What do these figures tell us about the extent of the terror and about an individual’s chance to survive it? Is there a general explanation of all these wars, this intentional killing and mostly unintentional famine? Are there any ground rules on how to avoid such disasters in the future? Is there a way out?

And sometimes you have to address these comprehensive questions to find comprehensive answers. We have to turn to experts who have spent their lives studying the catastrophes, trying to find similarities and generalizations. Maybe they know something that the rest of us have overlooked.

Today, when seven months of this century are left, we have concrete answers to several of the profound questions regarding war, mass murder and famine during these hundred years – in empirical studies, in thousands of tables and tens of thousands of basic examples, documents and testimonies. So it is not only an expression of democratic conviction or ideological righteousness to underline the importance of free nations. Scholars have fairly recently given us a view of the world that we did not have in the past.

Tyranny, according to these findings, is an even worse tragedy than we knew before. Democracy rescues us from even more disasters than we previously thought.

Appendix:

R. J. Rummel's definition of *Democide*:³

Democide's necessary and sufficient meaning is that of the intentional government killing of an unarmed person or people. Unlike the concept of genocide, it is restricted to intentional *killing*, and does not extend to attempts to eliminate cultures, races, or a people by other means. Moreover, democide is not limited to the killing component of genocide, nor to politicide, mass murder, massacre, or terror. It includes them all and also what they exclude, as long as such killing is a purposive act, policy, process, or institution of government.

In detail, *democide* is any actions by government:

- 1 Designed to kill or cause the death of people
 - 1.1 because of their religion, race, language, ethnicity, national origin, class, politics, speech, actions construed as opposing the government or wrecking social policy, or by virtue of their relationship to such people;
 - 1.2 in order to fulfill a quota or requisition system;
 - 1.3 in furtherance of a system of forced labor or enslavement;
 - 1.4 by massacre;
 - 1.5 through imposition of lethal living conditions;
 - 1.6 by directly targeting noncombatants during a war or violent conflict.
- 2 That cause death by virtue of an intentionally or knowingly reckless and depraved disregard for life (which constitutes practical intentionality), as in
 - 2.1 deadly prisons, concentration camps, forced labor, prisoners of war, or recruit camp conditions;

³ R.J. Rummel, *Death by Government*, 1994, pp. 36–38.

- 2.2 deadly medical or scientific experiments on humans;
 - 2.3 torture or beatings;
 - 2.4 encouraged or condoned murder, or rape, looting, and pillage during which people are killed;
 - 2.5 a famine or epidemic during which government authorities withhold aid or knowingly act in a way to make it more deadly;
 - 2.6 forced deportations and expulsions causing deaths.
- 3 With the following qualifications and clarifications:
- 3.1 “government” includes de facto governance, as by the Communist Party of the People's Republic of China; or by a rebel or warlord army over a region and population it has conquered, as by the brief rule of Moslem Turks (East Turkistan Republic) over part of Sinkiang Province (1944–46);
 - 3.2 “actions by governments” comprise official or authoritative actions by government officials, including the police, military, or secret service; or such non-governmental actions (e.g., by brigands, press-gangs, or secret societies) receiving government approval, aid, or acceptance;
 - 3.3 clause 1.1 includes, for example, directly targeting noncombatants during a war or violent conflict out of hatred or revenge or to depopulate an enemy region or terrorize or force the population into urging surrender; this would involve, among other actions, indiscriminate urban bombing or shelling or blockades that cause mass starvation;
 - 3.4 “relationship to such people” (clause 1.1) includes their relatives, colleagues, co-workers, teachers, or students;
 - 3.5 “massacre” (clause 1.4) includes the mass killing of prisoners of war or of captured rebels;
 - 3.6 “quota” system (clause 1.2) includes randomly selecting people for execution in order to meet a quota; or arresting people according to a quota, some of whom are then executed;
 - 3.7 “requisition” system (clause 1.2) includes taking from peasants or farmers all their food and produce, leaving them to starve to death;
 - 3.8 and excluding from the definition:
 - 3.8.1 execution for what are internationally considered capital crimes, such as murder, rape, spying, treason, and the like, as long as evidence does not exist that such allegations were fabricated by the government in order to execute the accused;

- 3.8.2 actions taken against armed civilians during mob action or a riot (e.g., killing people who have weapons in their hands is not democide);
- 3.8.3 the death of noncombatants killed during attacks on military targets, as long as the primary target is military (e.g., when bombing enemy logistics).